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All communities do not fare equally well after recessions and other 
economic shocks. Some bounce back fairly quickly. Others suffer more and 
take longer to recover—sometimes decades longer. A sluggish return to 
growth is not always necessary, however. There is evidence that well-
targeted policies may be able to speed the pace of recovery.  
Buffalo, New York is one example of a community that has suffered 
for far too long after an economic shock. In 1950, Buffalo was the nation’s 
15th largest city, boasting nearly 600,000 residents. It was a nexus of 
manufacturing and automobile and aircraft assembly and home to the 
world’s largest steel mill. Buffalo’s boomtown prosperity radiated out across 
Great Lakes shipping lanes and railway hubs, and attracted migrants from 
across the country. In 1970, the president of Bethlehem Steel, the operator of 
the steel plant, said of the city, “You can’t help but believe that a 
tremendous decade lies ahead.”  
But three harsh recessions between 1969 and 1982 pushed Buffalo 
and many other manufacturing-based cities off the path to prosperity. During 
each recession, manufacturing employment in the United States plummeted 
by between 9 and 15 percent. These were not temporary layoffs; jobs were 
eliminated, shifts were cut, and plants were closed.  Buffalo’s steel mill, 
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which had employed 20,000 workers in 1965, was shuttered completely in 
1982. That year, unemployment in the Buffalo area, which had been well 
above the national average for at least a decade, topped 12 percent. Today, 
local income, which was more than 6 percent above the national average in 
1970, is 9 percent below average. When jobs disappeared, so did workers—
in droves. By 2000, Buffalo’s population had fallen by half. Property values 
dropped and neighborhoods crumbled into disrepair, pocked with abandoned 
homes. More than a quarter of the city’s residents lived in poverty. 
Today, Buffalo remains distressed, and poverty in the central city 
remains very high, but the situation is improving. The Buffalo metropolitan 
area’s unemployment rate of 7.6 percent is below the national average. 
Employment rates have increased, and income, although still below average, 
is no longer falling even farther behind. New businesses have moved in. 
Developers, drawn to low property prices, have started to enter the local real 
estate market. Families have followed. In 2010, Forbes Magazine called 
Buffalo one of “America’s Best Places to Raise a Family,” based on factors 
such as cost of living, prevalence of homeownership, median household 
income, commuting time, crime, and high school graduation rates.  
No city should have to suffer the persistent distress that Buffalo and 
other cities have endured. It should not take 40 years for a city to recover. 
But the slow pace of recovery in the wake of the recent Great Recession, 
compounded by ongoing restructuring in the U.S. economy, raises the 
troubling prospect of creating a new set of economically troubled 
communities that will languish for a long time.  
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Here we draw on economic research to argue that a national economic 
strategy to aid distressed communities is both appropriate and necessary. 
There are many opportunities to develop and implement policies that can 
deliver more success stories and quicker recoveries, even in the wake of a 
rapidly-changing economy. We recognize, however, that every community 
is different and that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for the challenges 
facing economically distressed communities. We therefore propose a basket 
of options that could begin the process of restoring good jobs to local 
workers. Each option follows three approaches: attracting new businesses, 
aiding displaced workers, and matching workers to jobs.  
The problem of distressed communities 
Workers and their families living in especially hard-hit communities face a 
number of challenges. Unemployment in persistently distressed areas often 
arises from plant closings or mass layoffs associated with declines in 
specific industries and businesses. Unlike other types of joblessness, these 
losses can result in a permanent reduction of job opportunities as well as the 
erosion of workers’ marketable skills. In addition, evidence suggests that 
local economic shocks have long-lasting effects on local labor markets.  
Losing a long-held job does not just result in temporary 
unemployment. It often leads to a long-term loss of earnings even after 
workers are reemployed. Figure 1 summarizes a study completed by Till von 
Wachter, Jae Song, and Joyce Manchester that compares the earnings 
trajectories of workers who lost their jobs in a sudden mass layoff in the 
early-1980s recessions and workers who maintained their jobs throughout 
those recessions. Prior to the recessions, both groups’ earnings followed a 
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similar pattern. After the recessions, however, displaced workers faced 
devastating long-run earnings losses. Even in 2000, almost 20 years after the 
1980s recessions, a sizable earnings gap remained. According to the study, a 
displaced worker with six years of job tenure faced a net loss of 
approximately $164,000—over 20 percent of his or her average lifetime 
earnings. These future earnings losses dwarf the losses associated with the 
period of unemployment itself. 
Job loss also has calamitous effects on workers’ health and families. 
In the year after they lose their jobs, men with high levels of seniority 
experience mortality rates 50 to 100 percent higher than expected. Elevated 
mortality rates are still evident 20 years after job losses. Children of jobless 
workers also suffer income loss. They not only have a tough time finding 
jobs when the unemployment rate is high in their local labor market, but also 
earn considerably less than their peers elsewhere once they have entered the 
market. Earnings gaps persist even 10 years after these young people have 
left school. 
A sharp economic shock permanently affects communities just as it 
affects workers. For communities experiencing the largest economic 
contractions during recessions, the impact on employment and income can 
be extremely persistent. The data show that unemployment rate differences 
between distressed areas and the rest of the country dissipate within a 
decade, but this is largely due to workers leaving distressed areas rather than 
a resurgence of job opportunities. Figure 2 shows income for the 20 percent 
of counties that experienced the largest drops in inflation-adjusted income 
per capita during the early-1980s recessions. About 10 percent of U.S. 
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residents live in these counties. Prior to the recessions, average incomes in 
these counties (indicated by the purple line) moved in lockstep with incomes 
in the rest of the country (indicated by the green line). During the recessions, 
however, incomes in these counties plunged by 14 percent more than 
average per capita incomes elsewhere. 
For most of the country, it took less than two years after the end of the 
1982 recession for average incomes to return to their pre-recession levels. 
But for the hardest-hit communities, it took more than six years. Figure 2 
shows that, after the recessions, incomes in these counties began to grow 
again but at a slower rate than in the rest of the country. Instead of catching 
up, these communities lagged farther behind. Today, almost 30 years later, 
there is a gap of almost $10,000 in average per person income. 
A different, but still disconcerting pattern holds true for employment. 
Figure 3 illustrates the path of employment—defined as the share of local 
residents with a job—relative to where communities started in 1979, just 
before the recessions. Employment in the hardest-hit areas plunged—
roughly 4 percent of their respective populations lost jobs. Although 
employment growth eventually returned and roughly followed the trend in 
the wider economy, the gap has still not closed. There are simply fewer 
working adults in the most distressed areas even today. 
During the past 30 years, average earnings in the hardest-hit 
communities grew by only 12 percent, or about one-quarter the rate of the 
rest of the country. Employment as a share of the population increased by 
much less there than elsewhere, and populations grew more slowly. Because 
workers left these communities and took their families with them, 
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demographics changed too; there were fewer young people and more retirees 
and elderly. As a result, demand for housing was weaker and home prices 
increased more slowly than elsewhere. Falling home prices and lower rents 
may help workers stretch their budgets, but they are unlikely to offset the 
decline in workers’ income. 
An optimistic view is that these changes—falling wages and land 
prices—will ultimately spark a renaissance by attracting new businesses and 
providing new residents with better homes at lower cost. Indeed, in cities 
like Buffalo, economic factors like these are attracting businesses and 
families. But stabilization takes many years. That a recession could 
temporarily have dire effects is not surprising. But for its toll to be even 
greater by some measures a quarter-century later is sobering. 
Concerns about distressed communities are particularly salient today. 
The Great Recession and ongoing restructuring in manufacturing, 
construction, and other industries have affected some communities much 
more than others. There is a serious risk that new communities will face 
long-lasting economic hardship even as existing distressed communities 
continue to struggle. 
In our latest recession, the pattern of employment in the hardest-hit 
counties (Figure 4) reflects the geography of declining manufacturing 
activity in the Midwest and Southeast and the burst housing bubble in states 
with the greatest run-up in home prices. Unemployment is concentrated in 
the industrial Midwest—Michigan, northern Ohio, Indiana, and western 
Pennsylvania—as well as in states that have significant manufacturing 
operations, such as Alabama. It is also high in states where home building 
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had been an important source of economic growth, such as California, 
Nevada, Arizona, and Florida. 
It is particularly troubling that the geographic pattern of 
unemployment tends to reflect the pattern of employment in specific 
industries. Unless these industries return to full capacity or new industries 
move in, these communities face long-lasting economic hardship. 
The Great Recession’s geographic impact is very different from that 
of the 1980s recessions. Relatively few counties appear in the bottom 20 
percent in both periods. In the 1980s, oil- and gas-producing states such as 
Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Wyoming were hit hardest. The fact that 
these two patterns of distress differ so much is important because it tells us 
that the shocks that communities face vary from recession to recession and 
the risks that materialize are idiosyncratic and relatively unpredictable. 
 
Why national policy is needed 
Communities tend to become economically distressed when an industry 
declines. Because industries are not spread evenly across the country, 
problems in one industry can translate into a local disaster. This is especially 
true in manufacturing, because individual plants frequently employ hundreds 
or even thousands of workers.  
At the same time, sustained national economic growth requires an 
environment that is hospitable to new ideas and innovation. New industries, 
broader trade, and technological innovation ultimately lead to higher living 
standards for the country as a whole. 
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The juxtaposition of national benefits but idiosyncratic and large 
localized costs suggests one rationale for federal involvement: providing 
insurance against unforeseen risks. A number of state-based programs 
including unemployment, disability insurance, and Medicaid, insure against 
unforeseen risks for individuals. We believe that there are also reasons why 
the federal government should consider policies specifically directed at 
distressed communities. At their core, these rationales recognize that 
communities are greater than the sum of their individual parts. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for federal involvement is research 
showing that economic adjustment takes longer and is harsher than 
previously recognized. In many distressed communities, the post-recession 
rate of economic growth remains below that of the rest of the nation for 
decades. This suggests that there are substantial barriers to recovery and that 
overcoming them requires substantial help. There are four rationales for the 
federal government, in particular, to play a strong role in aiding these 
communities. These include its ability to:     
Promote agglomeration economies. Studies show that people and 
companies are more productive when they cluster, especially when they 
work in the same industry. Improvements in manufacturing processes and 
other efficiencies tend to diffuse to neighbors: When one company does 
better, others also improve. The private market does not capture these 
spillover benefits, however, and so, businesses do not take into account these 
potential gains when deciding where to locate. They need encouragement to 
gather together—encouragement that government can provide. 
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In the case of distressed communities, an economic shock that directly 
affects certain businesses may result in unforeseen costs to nearby 
businesses. Targeted programs to attract new businesses could help offset 
these costs. The rationale for intervention in this case is not to help a specific 
company, but to generate spillovers that benefit many local businesses. 
Policies should thus distinguish between cases where location subsidies 
generate broader growth and renewal effects and cases where subsidies 
benefit the recipient only. 
Avoid tipping points. Research suggests that persistently elevated 
unemployment can have a devastating impact on crime, teenage pregnancy, 
mental health, and other social problems. In The Truly Disadvantaged 
(1990) and When Work Disappears (1996), William Julius Wilson argued 
that many social problems are fundamentally the result of jobs disappearing. 
He and others argue that concentrated areas of economic distress and 
joblessness result in a breakdown of other social structures. 
In one version of this theory, when unemployment reaches a certain 
level or “tipping point,” negative consequences become much more severe. 
For example, an increase in the unemployment rate from 14 to 15 percent 
might be much more detrimental for a community than an unemployment 
increase from 4 to 5 percent. This suggests that there may be gains to 
reducing unemployment in particular areas, even at the expense of 
employment elsewhere. Although the theory is intriguing, the empirical 
evidence is mixed on the existence and significance of tipping points.  
Facilitate skill acquisition. There is promising evidence that education 
and training pay off in higher future earnings. But unemployed workers, 
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younger workers, and workers in distressed neighborhoods may not be able 
to afford the upfront cost of such an investment even if the returns 
eventually exceed the costs. The private market is less willing to make loans 
for training and education than for cars or homes, in part because workers 
cannot use future earnings as collateral. This provides a major rationale for 
the federal student loan program. 
In distressed communities, workers displaced from long-held jobs 
often have skills that are best suited to industries or occupations in decline. 
This is why they tend to earn less even if they manage to find new jobs. 
Evidence suggests that some of these workers would benefit from retraining, 
but that many tend to under-invest in additional schooling. Besides facing 
barriers to educational loans, they often lack good information about the 
returns to undertaking training programs. Government investments in the 
right kind of training for certain displaced workers could yield benefits 
greater than the costs of that training. 
Minimize adjustment costs. Adjusting to economic distress often 
involves incurring costs. History suggests that the movement of families to 
new places is a primary way for communities to adjust to economic shocks. 
But moving is costly and potentially wasteful. The costs of moving go 
beyond the costs of selling a home and shipping furniture. Families often 
develop strong bonds in their communities. When a family moves, children 
are uprooted from schools, and friends, social routines, memories, and local 
knowledge are left behind. It takes time and effort, moreover, to learn about 
a new community and become integrated members of it. There are few ways 
to avoid or mitigate these costs and no insurance policy against them. In 
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other words, people can’t protect themselves against the risk that a local 
employer will fail or that a vibrant industry may become obsolete. 
A similar argument can be made about infrastructure. It is impossible 
to ship roads and bridges to follow movements in population. When a city or 
community declines, it leaves behind a base of infrastructure meant to serve 
a larger population. The reverse is also true: Immigration and population 
growth may lead to congestion and require new infrastructure investment. 
Even when there are significant benefits to moving, there may be 
barriers that prevent people from relocating to a community with better job 
prospects. In this case, moving is an investment in future earnings, just like 
an investment in education. And just like unsecured educational loans, loans 
to facilitate moving are difficult or impossible to get, leaving workers 
unemployed or underemployed when they could do better elsewhere. 
 
Approaches to helping distressed communities 
Addressing the economic and social costs associated with persistent, 
localized economic distress requires a different set of policy tools from the 
ones the country has been using. Most existing policy and most social 
insurance spending are directed to people, not to places. This includes 
policies such as unemployment insurance, health insurance for children of 
unemployed or underemployed adults, food stamps, and other forms of 
assistance. These programs are, moreover, intended to be temporary 
solutions for short-term problems. Unemployment insurance in normal times 
lasts only 26 weeks, and other programs include time limits. In addition, 
most are conditioned largely on unemployment rather than on 
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underemployment. They protect against poverty caused by job loss, but not 
against lower wages. In short, these policies do not directly address the 
causes and costs of long-term economic distress on workers, their families, 
and their communities. 
There are alternative approaches that could promote economic 
recovery and shorten the depth and duration of economic distress by directly 
targeting residents, workers, businesses, and infrastructure in distressed 
communities. In the current fiscal and economic environment, it is even 
more important than usual that the benefits of these programs exceed their 
costs. Furthermore, these programs should be targeted at communities that 
meet objective criteria for persistent distress, such as high rates of 
unemployment or low rates of income growth over several years. 
We recommend a three-pronged approach to aiding distressed areas 
that is motivated by the fundamental mismatch between the skills of local 
workers and the demand for their work from local businesses and industries. 
This approach involves: 
Attracting new businesses that can provide jobs, raise wages, and 
provide local services. Distressed communities usually present a poor 
environment for business investment. Plant closings and mass layoffs result 
in increased poverty for local residents, who also are consumers. Detroit 
provides a particularly poignant example. There is no longer a single 
national grocery chain with an outlet in that city. In addition, shrinking tax 
bases can lead to cuts in key services such as the size of the police force, the 
quality of schools and physical infrastructure, and even basic services such 
as waste disposal and snow removal. Fewer municipal services effectively 
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raise the costs of doing business. Finally, of course, residents may not have 
the skills new companies are seeking. 
Communities have tried many approaches to attract businesses with 
mixed success. A typical approach has been to provide subsidies or tax 
breaks for new businesses. Policies based on this strategy have been tried for 
decades, but evidence of their effectiveness is weak. Tax cuts reduce overall 
business costs, but they may not compensate for the cost of establishing a 
new business. Businesses may also be wary of investing their own resources 
in programs such as job training that may not benefit them exclusively. They 
certainly cannot be expected to improve public infrastructure. 
Attracting businesses to revitalize distressed communities requires a 
holistic approach that targets all of the major problems these communities 
face. Tax cuts may be especially effective when combined with expansions 
in public services and infrastructure investment.  On-the-job training can 
help make labor costs in distressed communities more competitive. Other 
options include programs that provide direct consulting assistance to 
employers.  
Timothy J. Bartik, a senior economist at the W.E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research, has proposed one version of this approach.  In his 
paper “Bringing Jobs to People,” written for The Hamilton Project, Bartik 
argued for a return to the original Empowerment Zones created in the 1990s, 
which combined tax cuts for businesses with grants to state and local 
governments for public services. Additional grants would help businesses 
invest in training that is tailored to meet their specific needs. Bartik also 
argued for expanding the Manufacturing Extension Program, which offers 
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subsidized consulting services to small- and medium-sized manufacturers 
and has been demonstrated to improve their productivity and profitability. 
Recognizing that the body of evidence on the efficacy of place-based 
policies is mixed, Bartik’s proposal included methods to evaluate programs 
as they are scaled up so that policymakers can determine which ones are the 
most successful. 
Aiding displaced workers. As we have said, for people who lose a 
long-term job, the major cost is not the period of unemployment, which may 
last only a few months, but permanently lower earnings when they find new 
jobs. These long-term losses can exceed $100,000 over a lifetime and are not 
addressed by any programs. 
One option to consider is wage insurance, which would pay an 
unemployment insurance–like benefit to workers even after they find new 
jobs, if their new wages are much lower (say, 30 percent lower) than their 
previous wages. Wage insurance might fill 25 percent of the earnings gap.  
Another alternative is to help displaced workers improve their job 
skills. Evidence suggests that job training through community colleges can 
boost displaced workers’ earnings and help restore their incomes. A study in 
Washington State showed that the equivalent of a year of community college 
increased displaced workers’ earnings by 9 percent for men and 13 percent 
for women—a sizable return. Even taking just a few courses increased 
earnings substantially. 
The benefits of retraining, however, vary widely. They depend, in 
particular, on the types of students who retrain and the kind of courses they 
take. Quantitative subjects, science classes, and health care courses boosted 
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earnings by 14 percent for males and 29 percent for females, gains that come 
close to offsetting the losses from displacement. Success was greatest for 
younger workers and those demonstrating previous academic success. 
There are potential gains from retraining programs that include 
several high-return courses and from supporting institutions that provide 
these courses. It is especially important to support retraining during 
economic downturns, when cuts in government budgets often mean cuts in 
education. 
In “Retraining Displaced Workers,” a paper written for The Hamilton 
Project, Robert LaLonde of the University of Chicago and Daniel Sullivan 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago proposed increasing federal funding 
for retraining by extending Pell Grant eligibility to training-ready displaced 
workers even after they are reemployed. They also argued that there should 
be a federal mechanism for distributing aid for education and retraining 
during recessions in order to counteract the tendency of state and local 
governments to cut education budgets during those periods. To encourage 
training in fields with higher returns, LaLonde and Sullivan suggested that 
extra support should be provided for courses in technical fields and health 
care, which are often more costly for community colleges to offer. Both 
investments in community colleges and subsidies for retraining should be 
accompanied by financial aid policies that encourage students to complete 
their training. New policies should also evaluate the returns to different 
programs, establish standardized curricula, and disseminate information to 
help students make informed choices. 
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Matching workers to new jobs. The country needs to improve how it 
matches workers with jobs they are suited for. Losing a job is a harrowing 
experience for workers and their families. Some are able to adjust without 
government aid. These workers are generally well-educated and have 
substantial savings. Other displaced workers lack these advantages. Faster 
and better job matching would have national economic benefits, reducing the 
waste of resources from prolonged unemployment and underemployment. 
One approach would be to augment One-Stop Career Centers. In a 
2009 Hamilton Project paper, “Strengthening One-Stop Career Centers: 
Helping More Unemployed Workers Find Jobs and Build Skills,” Louis S. 
Jacobson, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and visiting professor at 
Georgetown University, noted that improving the job search assistance and 
counseling services that One-Stops offer—in particular, steering workers 
towards high-return training—could help workers improve their skills and 
match up with better jobs. 
Another approach is to help workers relocate to communities with 
greater job opportunities. Moving can be a good way to find work, but 
involves costs that are sometimes difficult to incur, especially during hard 
times. The slowdown in mobility that typically occurs during recessions has 
been even more pronounced during the Great Recession. Residential 
mobility rates in the United States are currently at an historic low as 
compared with past recessions. In fact they have reached their lowest levels 
since World War II.  
To give job seekers the resources to move for work, Jens Ludwig of 
the University of Chicago and Steven Raphael of the University of 
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California at Berkeley called for a creating a loan program to finance 
employment-related moves. As discussed in their Hamilton Project paper, 
“The Mobility Bank,” monthly loan repayments would depend on 
reemployment earnings. The mobility bank would be accompanied by 
increased use of national job banks that help people search more broadly for 
jobs. If workers have better job opportunities elsewhere—and a mobility 
bank to loan them the money to move—they would be more likely to depart 
distressed communities. This could improve their long-term earnings while 
also speeding recovery in distressed areas by reducing the glut of jobless 
individuals. 
 
Improving policy by learning what works 
Local development strategies in the past have included many kinds of 
programs, but policymakers lack good evidence for which programs work. 
Sometimes outcomes are not tracked at all. In other cases, there is no 
rigorous attempt to separate program effects from other economic and policy 
trends. Programs often are not designed with evaluation in mind even when 
slight modifications would make them easier to study. Lack of evidence of 
effectiveness undermines support for even those programs that may be 
working and creates a perception that local development projects are not 
cost-effective investments. 
Every new policy to speed up recovery in hard-hit communities 
should be accompanied by constant and rigorous evaluation so that the most 
promising approaches can be scaled up. This means a financial commitment 
and the political will to distinguish between good programs and bad ones 
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using the most credible empirical methods feasible. With knowledge of what 
works, the nation will be able to help future distressed communities avoid or 
shorten the decades-long period of adjustment that previously distressed 
communities have endured.  
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Figure 1 The Earnings of Displaced Workers 
 
Source: von Wachter, Song, and Manchester 2009, Figure 1A, p. 30. 
Note: Annual earnings in 2000 dollars. Earnings are at all jobs for men in a 
stable job from 1974 to 1979, and who separated in a mass layoff and did 
not separate in 1981. 
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Figure 2 Income Per Capita in Hardest-Hit Counties 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis n.d., Table CA04. 
Note: Income per capita includes total income excluding transfers. Dollar 
values adjusted to 2009 using CPI. The 1980–81 and 1981–82 recessions are 
grouped together. 
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Figure 3 Changes in Employment in the Hardest-Hit Counties 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis n.d., Table CA04. 
Note: The 1980–81 and 1981–82 recessions are grouped together. 
 
Figure 4 The Hardest-Hit Counties, 1980–82 and 2007–09 
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Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) n.d.; Card 1976–89. 
Note: The 1980–81 and 1981–82 recessions are grouped together. 
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